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Over the past two decades, economists have made significant advances in understanding how 
networks affect individual behaviour and shape aggregate outcomes. We argue that insights from 
network economics can play an important role in the design of economic policy. Focusing on six policy 
domains, we show that network economics not only deepens our understanding of existing policy 
concerns but also suggests a number of new policy questions. In each of these policy areas, we 
evaluate the availability of data and assess the suitability of the network economics toolkit for policy 
work. We conclude with a discussion of challenges to the adoption of network-based methods in 
economic policy along with strategies to overcome them. 
Introduction 
Economic activity takes place in an interconnected world. People are linked to each other by familial, 
social, and business ties. Firms are connected by competing in similar markets, by using each other’s 
inputs and outputs, and by participating in joint ventures. Governments are tied by alliances, by 
geographical proximity, by trade, by their openness to migration, and by cross-border capital flows. 
As economic activity involves interaction, individual behaviour is shaped by choices made by 
proximate agents, i.e., our neighbours. However, the (unpriced) effects of these neighbours on our 
behaviour – externalities – depend on the strength and the pattern of ties between us and our 
neighbours, on our neighbours’ ties with their neighbours, and so on. To understand how these 
externalities affect behaviour, we must therefore consider not only the direct contacts of an agent but 
also the more general structure of the connections in which all agents are embedded. We use the 
term networks to describe the overall structure of connections. 
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Over the last two decades, the study of networks has emerged as an important field of research in 
economics, complementing tools such as game theory and general equilibrium theory. Game theory 
is well-suited for the study of behaviour in small exclusive groups while general equilibrium theory 
provides a sophisticated approach for analysing large anonymous systems. Networks offer us a 
framework for understanding how local interactions affect large interconnected populations. In 
general, taking a networks approach can be thought of as moving to having a broader, system-wide 
perspective as opposed to a narrower focus that only takes smaller subjects (individuals, firms, or 
sectors) as the unit of analysis. Thus, networks help fill an important gap in the economists’ toolkit.  
The key methodological innovation offered by network economics is the systematic introduction of 
graph theory (and related concepts from discrete mathematics, probability theory, statistics, and 
linear algebra) into economics. Tools from network analysis allow economists to embed familiar 
concepts of strategy, information, prices, and competition into models of network-based interactions. 
These models are being applied to address an increasingly ambitious range of questions in economics.  
Networks serve different purposes. Some networks are functional: they allow us to communicate, to 
transact, or to transport; other networks, such as social networks of family and friends, also have 
inherent value. Networks also overlap: people are embedded in social and organisational networks. 
Firms are tied via production and lending networks while their owners and executives are themselves 
socially connected. Moreover, networks are dynamic and evolving: they change and adapt according 
to the decisions of network participants and due to shocks. Some friendships fizzle out, but new ones 
take their place; suppliers go bankrupt, but firms replace them with new ones.  As the government 
expands social insurance, informal insurance arrangements within communities may weaken; but as 
governments open up to foreign trade, ethnic groups may be able to use cross country community 
ties to facilitate long-distance transactions strengthening social ties.   
Connections can matter in different ways depending on the economic circumstances. For instance, a 
consumer seeking information about a new brand will probably do less personal search if he has many 
friends who are also searching. On the other hand, a firm may invest more in research if it has more 
collaborators to make better use of the fruits of its own research. Thus, the presence of connections 
may lower effort in some settings and increase effort elsewhere. 
In many settings, however, simply knowing the number of connections may not be enough to gauge 
relevant economic insights. For instance, consider a classroom with pupils from two ethnic 
communities and suppose that every pupil has two friends. Consider two possible networks. In one 
network, every pupil in a given ethnic community has all of their friends within the same community. 
In another network, each pupil has an equal number of friends from the two communities. Clearly, 
the flow of information and the interaction in the classroom would be very different depending on 
which of the two networks obtain. Thus, the overall structure of connections is important—over and 
above the number of connections. These observations suggest that understanding human behaviour 
in networks will require both a knowledge of the specificities of the economic circumstances—the 
content of interaction—as well as the knowledge of the structure of the network. 
As the structure of interaction matters, purposeful individuals and economic actors will strive to create 
networks that are productive and advantageous: This insight underlies theories of network formation. 
In these theories, individuals form connections with others based on a comparison of their costs and 
benefits. The returns from linking will again depend on the specific economic circumstances. Network 
formation theories can therefore deliver predictions of which network structures are likely to arise 
(i.e., stable networks) and which network structures might be desirable (e.g. from an efficiency point 
of view) in different situations. If individual and social preferences are aligned, stable networks can 
efficient. However, since externalities in linking are widespread, stable networks are typically 
inefficient (see, e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000)). 
At a high level, network economics has delivered three insights: first, it has shown that empirical 
networks exhibits heterogeneity (e.g., in the number of connections as well as in other individual 
network characteristics such as centrality). Two, the heterogeneity of networks has a profound effect 
on individual behaviour and aggregate outcomes across a range of economic environments. A key 
observation is that differences in network location – measured by the number of connections, 
closeness to others, and centrality within the network – can dramatically affect economic outcomes. 
Three, the theory of network formation has shown that individual linking choices can give rise to 
networks with very striking macroscopic features, (e.g., a core-periphery architecture in banking 
networks, fat tails in the distribution of the number friendships people have, and the small-world 
property in social networks whereby two agents have few degrees of separation).  
Now is a good time for network economics to become a standard part of economic policymaking. By 
many measures, our world is becoming more interconnected. People can keep in touch with all their 
high-school friends for the rest of the lives and foster new online relationships with hundreds of others 
around the world. Supply chains span the whole globe and people are able to travel more cheaply and 
safely than ever before. Satellite and communication technologies that underpin the shared economy 
allow people to enter into new kinds of economic networks. News, true and fake, as well as data, 
travel faster and further than ever before. At the same time, new protectionist policies could undo 
some of these changes, and a networks perspective can facilitate a better understanding of the trade-
offs. 
We therefore argue that insights from network economics can play an important role in economic 
policy. We illustrate where network economics has already had some success in policymaking, and 
suggest other fields in which network economics could fill important policy gaps. Specifically, we 
consider the role of network economics in six areas of economic policy making:  
1. Financial markets 
2. Competition policy  
3. Macroeconomic (sectoral) policies 
4. Development  
5. Labour, and  
6. Crime.  
We suggest necessary conditions for network economics to enter into the heart of economic 
policymaking: first, the abundance of relevant policy questions; second, the availability of cost-
effective data; third, the presence of usable tools; and, finally, the political will for a paradigm shift 
towards network economics in policymaking. We review these conditions and use them to provide a 
lens on finding the policy areas where networks might have more of an impact in the near term.5 
The policy areas we cover use rather different network data: the first three areas mainly use firm-to-
firm (or sector-to-sector) interconnections while the latter three rely on social network data.  
Increasing interconnections driven by globalization, digitisation, and the Internet are generating vast 
amounts of data. Smartphones record many of our transactions. Online platforms serve us 
recommendations on the basis of our friends’ preferences. Policymakers need to carefully consider 
what data are already available and what are the costs and benefits of collecting more data. 
In order to know what to make of all these data, we need a way of grappling with networks. Network 
economics uses a variety of methodologies in the policy areas we consider. These range from 
applications of graph theory to identify key network statistics that can be applied to shed new light on 
old questions in antitrust, through randomised controlled trials used in development to better 
understand the diffusion of technologies and information spread between social connections in poor 
communities. We are discovering new tools and technologies to meaningfully process huge datasets 
in order to make good public policy decisions. These tools range from applying advanced econometric 
techniques on social network data to find the most influential early adopters to the use of the newly 
reported data on financial connections between banks for running simulations that stress test the 
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financial system. The groundwork for network economics to have a lasting impact in these policy areas 
has been laid by decades of sociological research, together with recent insights from network 
economics. Allied with the new opportunities provided by new data, network economics is ready to 
be added to the toolkit of policymakers in these areas. 
The transition to network-based approach in all areas economic policy is unlikely to be immediate and 
smooth. Policy frameworks are highly path-dependent so it will take both time and political will to 
shift the paradigm away from economic policy-making based either on partial equilibrium models or 
on highly aggregated general equilibrium analysis.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we consider a set of important policy questions 
which have or could have benefited from economic network analysis. In Section 3, we look at different 
sources of network data. In Section 4, we briefly describe the tools available to policymakers to 
process and interpret network data. Finally, in Section 5 we point to political obstacles faced by 
policymakers. Section 6 is a conclusion. 
Questions 
Any field of inquiry is judged by its ability to answer existing questions and ask new questions. Network 
economics is no different: without new answers to existing questions and without its ability to open 
new lines of inquiry the network economics approach would be redundant to academics and 
policymakers alike.  
New answers to existing questions 
Let us begin with six typical questions in economic policymaking: 
1. Bank regulation: How strictly should the government regulate the financial sector? 
2. Competition policy: Is a merger anticompetitive? 
3. Macroeconomic and sectoral policy: How would a proposed macroeconomic policy impact 
different sectors of economy? 
4. Development policy: How can widespread adoption, among subsistence farmers, of a new 
more productive technology be achieved? 
5. Labour market policy: Do Job Centres increase employment? 
6. Rehabilitation policy: Does social worker support prevent criminals from reoffending? 
Economics has, of course, tried to address these policy questions. A traditional approach to these 
questions might proceed as follows: 
1. Evaluate the solvency of banks on a case-by-case basis and, if required, intervene on a case-
by-case basis. 
2. Conduct the SSNIP (small but significant and non-transitory increase in price) test to identify 
the smallest relevant markets within which a firm might have market power and evaluate the 
impact of the merger on competition in these markets. 
3. Analyse the costs and benefits of government policies on a sector-by-sector basis. 
4. Study the introduction and adoption of a new agricultural technology by farmers to better 
understand whether take-up is inefficiently slow, and thus whether government intervention 
may be merited.  
5. Stagger the introduction of Job Centres and study the change in area-by-area employment. 
6. Use variation in the provision of social worker support across time and space to study its 
comparative effectiveness on reoffending rates.  
However, seen through the lens of network economics, these answers appear partial and potentially 
insufficient. Let us compare the traditional approach with a networks perspective in each policy 
domain.  
Banks do not simply lend to households and to firms, but borrow and lend to each other. A bank that 
fails might not only cause other banks to fail in turn: even the perception of insolvency of a bank can 
have a dramatic effect on the willingness of other banks to transact with each other. Such illiquidity 
can cause panic and create runs on solvent banks. Therefore, evaluating the regulatory requirement 
on an individual bank without stress-testing the effect of the bank’s failure on the whole financial 
system can mislead the regulators: a system that seems “robust” to small market fluctuations, might 
be “fragile” in the face of the failure of systemically important banks (Gai and Kapadia, this issue). 
SSNIP tests are the bread and butter of competition policy. However, focusing on a narrow definition 
of a market can miss the bigger picture: price changes in one market can cause firms in adjacent 
markets to respond strategically and adjust their prices. A networks perspective can allow out-of-
market constraints to be directly incorporated into calculations informing antitrust investigations in 
order to give a more refined view about the likely competitive impact of a merger. Elliott and Galeotti 
(this issue) show that ignoring these out-of-market effects can substantially bias estimates about the 
impact of a merger on competition. 
When an industry is in trouble, the government is often under pressure to take action to save or to 
cut off support to the industry. However, the effect of shocks in one industry can have far larger 
aggregate effects than the impact on the industry itself. The reason is that industry-level changes 
propagate through the inter-sectoral network changing prices, profits, and labour demand throughout 
the economy (Grassi and Sauvagnat, this issue). Moreover, large shocks can often result in hysteresis 
effects: dramatic and permanent changes in output that are not corrected by price adjustments. A 
prominent example is the executives of Ford and Chrysler who lobbied the Obama administration to 
bail out their competitor General Motors during the financial crisis, as they feared that GM’s collapse 
would destroy the supply chain that both companies relied on (Acemoglu et al, 2015; Baqaee, 2018). 
Therefore, industrial policies cannot simply focus on individual industries; rather they must take the 
input-output structure of the economy carefully into account. 
Many governments support the adoption of new technologies. In a development context agriculture 
is often important and new technologies can have the potential to lift farmers out of poverty. 
Innovations are often adopted following word-of-mouth recommendations from those we trust: 
technological diffusion is a network-based phenomenon (Grilliches, 1957; Coleman, 1966). For 
example, in early work Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) investigate technological diffusion for the case 
of the adoption of high-yield crops in India during the agricultural revolution. Network economics 
provides a rich framework that can help development researchers to get a deeper understanding of 
such diffusion. By collecting data on social relationships, the role of individual connections in diffusion 
can be properly modelled and analysed. Although the idea that the identity of early adopters might 
matter has been around in the development literature for a while, the network-based features of such 
“influentials” are still poorly understood.  Policymakers need appropriate network-based theories for 
the given context to decide whom to “seed”, and for deciding whether leveraging the network 
structure is worthwhile (Breza et al., this issue). Finally, in the context of field interventions, there is a 
need to elicit relevant network measurements as economically as possible. 
Active labour market policies try to match people to jobs by, for example, offering them training and 
information. However, a large proportion of jobs are found through distant social contacts i.e. weak 
links (Granovetter, 1973). Improving information about jobs in one area can spill over to other areas 
through social contacts that bridge these regions obfuscating and underestimating the impact of the 
policy. But virtually no active labour policy helps people build and leverage social connections in the 
labour market to facilitate these spillovers (which is helpful to those finding jobs thought not the 
researcher assessing the impact of the policy!). Enacting policies that complement the spillovers 
should help make active labour market policies more effective (Topa, this issue). 
Since the seminal work of Becker (1968), crime has been viewed by economists in the context of the 
incentives and opportunities that people face. This perspective on crime has led economists to 
consider how, in particular, good behaviour can be encouraged and bad behaviour discouraged with 
appropriate incentives. But behaviour is heavily influenced friendships so people often coordinate on 
types of behaviour and social norms that reflects their social networks. For example, connections 
formed in prison are likely to be important for both encouraging reform and removing opportunities 
and incentives to reoffend. Moreover, people also form their friendships in a way that reflects their 
preferences and reinforces their behaviour. Understanding patterns of social influence and social 
network formation can therefore be crucial in reducing delinquency and crime (Lindquist and Zenou, 
this issue).  
New questions 
There are two themes that run through questions asked by network economists: 
How does the pattern of connections affect individual behaviour and shape aggregate outcomes?  
When an agent takes an action, other agents in the network will respond by changing their actions. 
The strength and direction of the response will depend on their position in the network. For example, 
when an industry becomes less competitive thereby raising its prices, it affects the input prices and 
the profits not just of its immediately downstream sector, but also of all the downstream sectors in 
the economy (e.g., Grassi (2017)).  
To understand effects of changes in incentives or of a shock on an individual entity, we need to a 
theory of how changes in an individual’s behaviour spread through connections and alter the 
incentives of others and in turn come back to influence the originally affected individual. Depending 
on the context, different aspects of individual connections and the overall network structure will 
matter. Network economics proposes general methods to understand how the content of interaction 
and the structure of the network jointly shape behaviour. In particular, network economics highlights 
the role of classical network measures – such as centrality, connectedness, clustering, and the 
cohesiveness of the network.6 
What are the incentives of individuals to create/dissolve ties and how does this formation process 
shape the architecture of networks?  
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the network economics research programme is the study of 
network formation. A range of models have been developed to examine how individual incentives 
shape the formation of networks and how the externalities inherent in the formation process create 
social costs and benefits. As networks are often complex and overlapping, changes in one network can 
have a dramatic impact on other networks. This is probably the least well-understood and the most 
challenging aspect of applying network economics to policymaking. For example, after the 
                                                            
6 For an overview, see Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008); for a recent survey of the literature, see Bramoullé, 
Galeotti and Rogers (2016) and Jackson, Rogers and Zenou (2018).  
introduction of microfinance in a village, villagers may sever not only their risk-sharing relationships, 
but also their social ties (Banerjee et al., 2018).  On the other hand, after the opening of international 
trade, social ties within an ethnic group spread across different countries may be reinforced.7 
These two themes set the stage for a statement of the central question on the role of networks in the 
design of economic policy:  
How can networks be used to design effective policy interventions? 
To get an answer to this question, the policymaker must (i) understand how the networks mediate the 
actions of each agent; (ii) appreciate the relative importance of individual or groups of agents as 
determined by their network positions, and (iii) estimate how the network forms and be able to 
anticipate how the network will evolve in response to policy changes. The answer comes with a prize: 
the policymaker can greatly expand her set of cost-effective interventions. Indeed, a policymaker 
trained in network economics can not only seek new network-based answers to the questions posed 
in the previous section, but also ask more nuanced questions that reflect her understanding of the 
importance of networks: 
1. Is a bank “too connected to fail” and should such a bank be subject to additional regulation? 
2. How does a firm’s position in the industry competition network confer market power on it?  
3. Which sectors should the government target in reviving an economy during a recession?  
4. How would word-of-mouth communication spread information about a new technology? 
5. How large are the spillovers from active market policies within and across neighbourhoods? 
6. Do past and present social connections affect the efficacy of rehabilitation policies?  
Ideally, policy implementation results from a meticulous examination of basic empirical phenomena 
in conjunction with the creation and refinement of theories, leading to careful policy design. Urgent 
banking regulations following the financial crisis, however, often became policies before 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical underpinnings had been established, and, as a result, many 
of these policies are still being revised and fine-tuned. On the other hand, network-based competition, 
development, and macroeconomic policies appear somewhat overdue since policymakers are already 
sitting on growing body of theoretical and empirical tools that can help design new regulations. Finally, 
the latter two questions on our list are, thus far, the subject of more intense inquiry by academics 
than by policymakers and practitioners, but hold considerable promise for successful policies in the 
future. 
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We now briefly examine what network data and methodological tools are available to policymakers 
to tackle policy questions before examining each of the six questions in greater detail. 
Network Data 
Policy must be based on evidence and evidence requires data. Clearly, in order to use insights from 
network economics for policy, the policymaker is required to have the relevant network data. 
Although in some cases these data need to be purposefully collected, often network data already 
exists. Since data collection carries not only benefits, but also costs, it is crucial to understand how 
useful data collection will be for evaluating policy interventions.  
Repurposing existing network data  
Policy-relevant network data often already exist and they simply need to be repurposed for network 
analysis. One example is infrastructure and locational data. Governments typically keep records of 
roads, railways, public transport links, pipelines, and electricity networks. Proximity data based on 
transport links and locations can be a valuable proxy for social or economic connections. For example, 
municipalities in Colombia that were well-connected by the road network experienced greater 
spillovers from state capacity investments (Acemoglu et al., 2015). Proximity data can be helpful in 
understanding neighbourhood effects and can help target active labour market policies (Topa, this 
issue). In a similar vein, prisons often keep digital records of prison inmates allowing crime agencies 
to estimate a network of social contacts among former convicts that could help target rehabilitation 
interventions appropriately (Lindquist and Zenou, this issue). Finally, sectoral input-output tables are 
important sources of data for network-based macroeconomic policy. 
Network data as a by-product 
The emergence of online social networks and digitalisation of many services has created a rich source 
of network data. For example, recorded interactions between users on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn 
and other social platforms have resulted in rich troves of social network data. Many companies are 
collecting locational data in order to serve location-based advertisements, but these data also paint a 
picture of social contexts in which individuals live. In addition to transaction-level data collected by 
credit card companies and lending data from peer-to-peer lending platforms, there are now also many 
public ledgers of anonymised cryptocurrency transactions, such as Bitcoin. While transaction-level 
data has been carefully guarded by private firms, governments are stepping in too. For example, 
governments are digitising VAT records in order to improve tax collection thereby keeping a record of 
the network of firm-to-firm and firm-to-consumer transactions (Spray, 2017). 
Data created for academic purposes  
In order to study the importance of networks in different contexts, academics have often tried to 
collect bespoke datasets that could be made available to researchers around the world. The most 
famous example of a large-scale academic effort to collect social network data is the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) which collected individual 
characteristics and social connections of thousands of American adolescents. This dataset has been 
accessed by over 30,000 researchers, generating over 2,600 research articles. Among other things, 
these data have allowed researchers to understand the impact of social connections on delinquency 
and obesity (Lindquist and Zenou, this issue). The second notable example of publicly available social 
network data is the Indian microfinance diffusion data. Banerjee et al. (2013) collected two waves of 
social network data in 75 remote Indian villages in order to help an NGO spread microfinance more 
effectively. The researchers mapped out social networks in each village by asking more than a dozen 
specific questions about the villagers’ social connections. These are now hundreds of field experiments 
which are now studying the impact of networks on economic outcomes: As of August 2019, the AEA 
RCT Registry alone returned 186 experiments which mention “networks”. 
Network data collected explicitly for conducting policy  
Network data is also being collected by policymakers precisely because such data can already be used 
in policy decisions. For example, large companies are required to report on their largest suppliers and 
owners. Such data allows policymakers to assess the impact of bankruptcies on supply chains and 
assess the true nature of market competition. Border agencies also collect data on shipping containers 
in order implement tariffs and regulations thereby mapping out the network of world trade. Finally, 
since the Global Financial Crisis, many countries, including the US and the UK, have required banks to 
report data on their counterparties. Financial network data allows central banks to create a rough 
picture of the entire financial system and more accurately assess the systemic importance of financial 
institutions (Gai and Kapadia, this issue).  
Innovations that reduce costs of collecting data as well as techniques that enable partial network data 
to be used for inference are likely to be extremely valuable. One such technique is Aggregated 
Relational Data (ARD) that consist of responses to questions of the form "How many of your social 
connections have trait k?" Breza et al. (2018) estimate that aggregate relational data approaches can 
be 80% cheaper than standard surveys of social networks (see also Breza et al., this issue). 
Data for network-based policy questions 
We now return to the examples of networks-based policy questions we outlined previously and 
consider the data available and required for successful policy implementation. 
Is a bank “too connected to fail” and should such a bank be subject to additional regulation? 
Following the financial crisis major, legislation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, Basel III, Basel IV 
and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in Europe, have been implemented to help 
make banks’ financial interdependencies more transparent and to avoid the need for future 
government bailouts of systemically important institutions. As an example, the EMIR requires that 
both parties involved in a derivatives trade report the transaction (although one party may designate 
the other to report on its behalf). These reporting requirements have furnished central banks with the 
data required for a network based analysis of financial stability. However, counterparty reporting 
requirements do not cover the entire network of financial transactions. The legislation typically 
focuses on banks rather than financial institutions more broadly defined. In particular, unlike 
commercial banks, financial institutions that do not take deposits are subject to less stringent 
regulations. These “shadow banks”, such as hedge funds, broker-dealers and money market funds, 
provide similar services to the banking sector but largely lie outside of reporting regulations. As a 
result, a policymaker might be concerned that their view of the financial network is not only partial 
but also potentially systematically biased. 
How does a firm’s position in the industry competition network confer market power on it? 
Under existing frameworks, a first step in an antitrust investigation is to define the market of interest. 
Doing so requires understanding to what extent products or services within the market are 
substitutable with those outside the market. Thus, elasticities of substitution are estimated between 
the relevant products. In some instances, a network approach can be adopted without collecting any 
additional data. This is true for the main application of supermarket competition discussed in Elliott 
and Galeotti (this issue): the scope of the enquiry is national but markets are defined to be local, data 
to estimate substitutability between adjacent regions will necessarily be collected anyway, and these 
data can be redeployed to inform a network-based approach. 
However, in other instances, while data is available on some substitute products and services (typically 
such data on prices and product/service sales is routinely collected by businesses), data might not be 
available for all the weak and possibly long chains of interaction. For example, to analyse competition 
in bus transit markets, data on taxis might currently be collected to determine whether taxis should 
be considered to be in the same markets as buses. On the other hand, a policymaker might not collect 
data on chauffeur-driven private hire vehicles since their elasticity of substitution with buses is likely 
to be very low. However, since chauffeur-driven private hire vehicles might substitute directly for taxis, 
they can still indirectly impact the bus market. As a result, a policymaker informed by network 
economics might also be interested in price and quantity data on chauffeur-driven private hire vehicles 
for her bus market inquiry, if these are expected to directly compete taxis which in turn might directly 
compete with buses. A comprehensive network-based approach can require gathering more data than 
would be collected when using more traditional methodologies. 
Nevertheless, even when additional data is required for a full networks approach, a partial networks 
approach might still add value. For example, in the 2011 Competition Commission Local Bus Services 
Market Investigation, substitution between buses and both car travel and taxi travel was investigated, 
but both cars and taxis were found to be outside of the market. The (weak) competitive constraints 
imposed by these alternative modes of transportation could be incorporated into a partial network 
analysis without more data being collected. 
Which sectors should the government target in reviving an economy during a recession? 
Aggregate data on the interlinkages between different sectors of the economy has long been available 
through well maintained input-output tables. However, while analysing these aggregated connections 
directly provides some interesting insights on which sectors are important (see, for example, 
Acemoglu et al. 2015), the devil is often in the detail which is lost in the aggregation. Firm-level 
connections aggregate up into sector-level connections, and heterogeneity in the firm-level 
connections matters. For example, the exact structure of firm-level connections affects competition 
in the supply chain, which in turn can affect the transmission of shocks. Moreover, firm-to-firm 
networks amplify the effect of microeconomic wedges on the economy’s total factor productivity 
(Baqaee and Fahri, 2019). 
More disaggregated and more detailed data is becoming available each year. While the reporting 
requirements of companies about their largest suppliers have long given us some partial information 
about business-to-business transactions (for example, through the Compustat database), 
governments are starting to collect much more detailed information. In several countries, new value 
added tax (VAT) data collecting systems are being introduced that record all business-to-business 
transactions by using VAT numbers (for example, Spray (2017) makes use of such data to analyse the 
Ugandan economy). Firm-level tax data therefore provides new opportunities for identifying key firms 
within an economy which may help in the design of more finely targeted policies.  
How would word-of-mouth communication spread information about a new technology? 
In order to understand how an agricultural innovation diffuses, two types of data need to be collected. 
First, the policymaker requires data on the timing of each adoption decision: we need to know not 
just who adopts, but who adopts when. Adoption data can be collected using surveys by relying on 
the recollections of participants about timing. For many digital technologies collection can also be 
done more precisely using mobile phone data. There are key events that occur prior to adoption that 
can be useful to document. The “discovery”, “intention-to-adopt”, “experimental adoption” and 
“actual adoption” steps can involve different timings which might be crucial to understand in order to 
evaluate successful adoption. For example, a farmer might first hear about a technology; then talk to 
several friends about it; then buy the seeds (which could be traced via an order placed on a mobile 
phone); plant the seeds to see if they will catch on, and only then finally switch to a new seed. The 
second type of data that need to be collected is the social network data that guides each step of 
technological adoption process. For example, the policymaker might need to understand different 
types of social (e.g. religious or familial) and business relationships as well as the intensity of 
interaction of various farmers. Some of the connections might be well captured by proxies: for 
example, castes or surnames could trace familial, social, or religious links while geodesic distance or 
mobile phone data could approximate the frequency of interactions. 
How large are the spillovers from active market policies within and across neighbourhoods? 
In the traditional analysis of the labour market, policymakers look at unemployment, vacancies, as 
well as new and filled positions within industries and across the whole economy. Typically, however, 
policymakers have no ability to observe one of the main job-seeking and hiring strategies: social 
connections. In the past, these data were unavailable, however, there are now many digital services, 
such as LinkedIn, in which allow workers to display their resumes, record social connections, and make 
job recommendations. There are also dozens of other job-search websites---which are not social 
network platforms but where workers voluntarily upload their resumes---which can track the 
movement of workers between firms and across industries over time. Since privacy might be less of a 
concern for public job profiles than for personal social media accounts, the social connections data 
could in principle be used directly in public policy. Governments can also recreate much of the firm-
to-firm worker movement data via personal tax returns, social security contributions, and firm reports 
and match them to education records. However, tax record data often comes with long lags thereby 
being an imperfect substitute for much of the social network data. 
Do past and present social connections affect the efficacy of rehabilitation policies? 
Different social behaviours are affected by social networks. For example, the likelihood of delinquency 
might not only increase due to current associations with delinquents, but also by past connections in 
prisons.  Therefore, in order to use networks for improving rehabilitation, data on past and present 
social networks might need to be collected and analysed. For example, past school connections, links 
in prisons, links with co-offenders, hierarchical relationships within criminal organisations, as well as 
family links to crime might all need to be examined. Law enforcement agencies, of course, collect a lot 
of such data on criminal, but using such data for social policies may create substantial privacy 
concerns. However, it is worth noting that some of the social network data—such as school, co-
offending, and prison links—are often a matter of public record. Coarse and partial social networks 
could be constructed in order to understand which groups of individuals are most central allowing 
agencies to target policies that would have the largest impact on the network of delinquents (rather 
than simply going after the most egregious offenders). 
Analytical toolkit 
If network economics is to help economic policy, having vast amount of network data and a set of 
pressing policy questions will not suffice. A rigorous analytical toolkit is required to interpret the data. 
This toolkit has two components: econometrics and economic theory.  
Since networks capture interdependencies in decisions, they should create anxiety for any 
policymaker wants to evaluate an intervention. As we argued above, an intervention targeted at one 
agent in a network might not only affect all agents in the network to a different degree but could also 
alter the network itself. But if everything affects everything else, how can one possibly establish cause 
and effect? In input-output networks and financial network analysis, the standard approach is 
calibration: matching the observations of the inter-sectoral to parameters in a theoretical model 
(Grassi and Sauvagnat, this issue). But, in recent years, network econometrics has started to develop 
techniques for isolating causes and effects in complex, interconnected systems. Network 
econometrics can help policymakers interpret the empirical findings, know where causal relationships 
have been found, and provide caveats where interpreting the data. 
Field experiments and natural experiments play a key role in identifying the importance of connections 
on economic outcomes. For example, by using random allocation of students to dorm rooms, 
Sacerdote (2001) estimates strong effects of peer on education outcomes. Algan et al. (2019) find that 
“integration groups” that freshmen are randomly assigned to have long term impact on students’ 
political opinions. In a similar vein, Bayer et al. (2009) find that former inmates’ probability of 
reoffending is strongly affected by the prison peers. 
However, while it might be feasible to identify the importance of individual connections, it becomes 
much harder to identify the importance of whole network structure. Broadly, there are two possible 
approaches. One approach is to look for exogenous variation within networks in order to identify peer 
effects. For example, if agent A’s only friend B is connected to C then agent C can only be affected by 
A via A’s effect on B (Bramoullé et al., 2009). However, the accuracy of these instrumental variable 
approaches depends heavily on accurate knowledge of the network (Blume et al., 2013). Another 
approach might be to exploit variation across network structures. For example, individuals with 
different network characteristics could be randomly targeted across different networks. However, this 
approaches relies on networks–e.g., social networks of remote villages—to be sufficiently isolated. In 
practice, most networks are not completely isolated so one can instead experiment by targeting 
agents who are “sufficiently far” from each other in the network (Aral et al., 2009). However, in social 
networks, many individuals are only separated by only few degrees of separation and as a result 
experimental treatments may be “contaminated” by interference. Understanding how to perform 
randomised controlled trials in networks is becoming an active area of research (see, e.g., Jagadeesan 
et al., 2019). 
Identification is further complicated if agents can change the network. If the researcher does not fully 
understand the cost and benefits of network formation, they might misattribute the effects of a 
changing network to agents’ actions in the network. Econometric tools for estimating effects of 
interventions in the presence of network formation have only recently been developed, and are still 
in their infancy (Chandrasekhar, 2016). Theories of network formation can guide identification but 
different identification methods are often difficult to carry across settings.  Suppose a policymaker 
tries to identify the effects of financial regulation. They might face the following problem: How do 
banks respond to new regulations that target systemically important banks? Since regulation changes 
banks’ incentives to maintain existing and form new links, it is crucial to understand how the banking 
network will reorganise itself into a new equilibrium after regulation. Without a theory of link 
formation, the policymaker is likely to miss a key effect of regulation. However, the theory of link 
formation for banks is likely to be quite different from the theory of link formation for subsistence 
farmers, which means that different econometric approaches might be required. 
More generally, however, economic theory can also play an important role in interpreting data 
findings. Suppose that the policymaker has collected data on all business-to-business VAT transactions 
in order to reduce tax evasion. While such data certainly serves a purpose, what else can be done with 
it? Looking at the pattern of connections might in principle identify bottlenecks—businesses that sit 
at key junctions in network and, through these network positions, command market power. But how 
can such bottlenecks be found? What is the right network statistic to focus on? Here, theory, 
particularly the combination of graph theory and economic theory, is crucial. Naturally, existing 
theories might offer different predictions, but when delving into network data analysis it is important 
to be armed with theoretical predictions to avoid looking for policy needles in a network data 
haystack—or, more worryingly, mining the data for correlations that may be spurious and misinform 
policy decisions.  
Finally, economic theory can only help focus on the important forces that will determine whether a 
policy intervention will be successful. For example, models of information diffusion in networks reveal 
that the relevance of a network characteristic depends on the specific type of innovation being 
considered. In some cases, the key constraint is information availability: here, it may be desirable to 
target individuals based on their number of connections. By contrast, in other contexts, adoption 
involves coordination of actions with neighbours, and it may be desirable to target groups of 
connected individual based on the level of interconnectedness of the group (i.e., their cohesiveness). 
The data required to implement innovation enhancing policies in these contexts would differ 
accordingly (Banerjee et al., 2013; Galeotti and Goyal, 2009; Reich, 2016). Similarly, in the context of 
macroeconomic policy using input-output tables, economic theory helps in identifying the network 
measures that are relevant for policy interventions (Grassi and Sauvagnat, this issue). 
Tools for network based policy questions 
We now return to the examples of networks-based policy questions we outlined previously and 
consider the analytical tools required for successful policy implementation. 
Is a bank “too connected to fail” and should such a bank be subject to additional regulation? 
Nowadays, as a matter of routine, central banks undertake stress tests in which they simulate different 
shocks to the economy to identify any fragilities. A stress test is typically based on a model of financial 
contagion in which loss in the value of assets in one bank affects the value of the assets as well as the 
borrowing and lending decisions of the other banks. In Europe, these stress tests also help identify 
systemically important banks that subsequently become subject to tighter capital requirements 
(under Basel IV). A consequence of the regulation is that banks have incentives to avoid being classified 
as systemically important. Regulation avoidance might influence the network structure of financial 
transactions i.e. which banks transact with which other banks. If regulators can run stress tests 
perfectly and the banks can anticipate the stress test, then they have an incentive to rewire their 
connections to make themselves and the entire system robust. However, if the regulator runs 
imperfect stress tests, then the rewriting incentives might instead lead to a financial system that is 
more fragile than before: there might be “unknown unknowns” not accounted for in the stress tests 
and as the system become more robust to those things being tested for, it may also become more 
fragile with respect to these “unknown unknowns”. More concretely, stress tests could lead to the 
tighter regulation of banks, causing shadow banks to become more prominent players in the financial 
system, ultimately making the system as a whole more fragile. Regulators are, of course, aware of 
these problems and attempt to disclose only the relevant information about stress test that would 
limit strategic transaction rewiring. However, better understanding how banks will react to the 
regulations and change their financial interdependencies can be aided by a better understanding of 
the incentives underlying the network formation process—an active but as of yet underdeveloped 
area of theoretical and empirical research.   
How does a firm’s position in the industry competition network confer market power on it? 
A network-based analysis of competition across as well as within markets can build immediately on 
the tools from standard competition policy. From a theoretical perspective, off-the-shelf IO tools (such 
as Cournot or Bertrand games) that have been refined over the last three decades just need to be 
combined with tools that have more recently been developed in papers on games in networks 
(Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé et al., 2014). The underlying approach described by Elliott and 
Galeotti (this issue) can already be adapted on a case-by-case basis to arising regulatory antitrust 
questions such as merger. The econometric ingredient needed for network-based models is the 
estimation of well-studied statistics—in particular, elasticities of substitution among products and 
services. Advanced tools have already been developed for this purpose and can also be put to use in 
a networks context. While academic work will continue to push the state-of-art in these settings and 
provide improved tools over time (e.g., by going beyond linear models, e.g. Parise and Ozdaglar, 2019), 
policymakers already have an arsenal of applicable tools at their disposal. 
Which sectors should the government target in reviving an economy during a recession? 
An underlying tool of the macroeconomic networks literature is competitive equilibrium which 
provides a well-studied and well-understood benchmark into which inter-sectorial linkages are 
embedded. Price-taking models are also amenable to the introduction of imperfect competition and 
frictions in a reduced form (e.g. through exogenous mark-ups or taxes) which can provide a lot of 
realism and flexibility to these models (see, for example, Liu, 2017; Baqaee, 2018; Acemoglu and Azar 
2019; Baqaee and Fahri, 2019; Grassi and Sauvagnat, this issue).8 Importantly, these theoretical 
foundations also make these rich models relatively easy to take to data. A typical approach here is to 
start with parameterised model, calibrate it, and use the calibrated model it to shed new light on 
patterns in the data and glean new insights about, for example, how shocks propagate through the 
economy and are amplified by this transmission process. Such a calibrated model can also be used to 
run policy counterfactuals thereby helping inform policy-making. 
How would word-of-mouth communication spread information about a new technology? 
Classic studies of technological adoption have found that technological diffusion typically follows a 
logistic curve: initially, there is a slow process of adoption, followed by a rapid acceleration in the take-
up, and ending with adoption slowing down. Moreover, new technologies appear to spread via social 
contacts based on friendships or geography. However, since the initial set of adopters in observational 
studies is endogenous, the characteristics of initial adopters might be systematically different from 
non-initial adopters. For example, initial adopters might be all risk-takers with relatively poor 
                                                            
8 Recently an input-output-based approach has also been used to integrate imperfect competition. See, for 
example, Grassi (2017) and Grassi and Sauvagnat (this issue). 
connections (at least in terms of the influence they can exert on others). Therefore, if a policymaker 
is interested in persuading some initial farmers to adopt a new technology in the expectation that 
their friends will also adopt and so on, she should not simply use target the people who have 
characteristics similar to initial adopters that encouraged wider spread uptake of a technology from 
previous observational studies. Field experiments have recently become widely used by researchers 
to help overcome this limitation with observational data. By targeting individuals at random to initially 
adopt and tracking the spread of adoption, it is possible to learn which characteristics, including their 
network positions, make people better initial adopters.  
Since there are many network-based individual characteristics (e.g., centrality measures), it is 
important to organise data using theories of diffusion in order to test and refine the relevant model 
of diffusion in a particular context. There are many such theories and models: for example, the 
independent cascade model in which each adopter informs all of his friends about a technology with 
a certain probability; or the threshold model, in which each agent adopts a technology as soon as a 
certain fraction of his friends have adopted the technology. With appropriate data, a horse race can 
then be run between the various theories to determine which model best fits the data. 
How large are the spillovers from active market policies within and across neighbourhoods? 
Most theoretical search-and-matching models that are used in policymaking ignore two crucial 
features of the labour market: the importance of social connections and the relationships between 
industries and individual firms. Both of these features matter for the likelihood that a worker gets a 
job in particular firm and for the chances that the worker moves to another firm or transitions for 
another industry. The labour market is therefore a dynamic network: in every time period, there are 
flows of workers into firms and flows of workers out of firms (either into unemployment, different 
firms, or self-employment). Dynamic network models are typically analysed in a steady state 
equilibrium in order to understand long-run patterns that are expected to emerge. Such models might 
not only allow policymakers to identify early signs of recessions, but also test and target policies more 
effectively. For example, one could test whether older workers with a lot of connections in the 
community are effective at helping young workers into employment. If so, then due to a social 
network multiplier effect, an active labour market policy that targets the retraining of older workers 
to get them into work could be much more cost-effective at getting young workers into jobs than 
targeting the young workers directly. 
Do past and present social connections affect the efficacy of rehabilitation policies? 
Networks with many types of connections between agents are typically represented by multigraphs. 
If rehabilitation policy is sensitive to different types of social connections, it is important to understand 
how different types of links affect one another. For example, a network formation model might build 
in a complementarity or a substitutability in the effort required to maintain each type of social link 
(see, e.g., Joshi et al., 2017). Randomized controlled trials that shock the incentives to form links can 
then examine whether the disappearance of one type of link causes breaking other types. For 
example, Banerjee et al. (2018) showed that the disruption of lending relationship by the introduction 
of microfinance reduced the fraction of connections based on social activities, such as attending 
religious services. At present, multigraph models of network formation are still in their infancy and 
poorly understood by network economists. Moreover, as with banking regulation, any policy that 
targets individuals based on their links can change their incentives for link formation in unexpected 
ways. 
A paradigm shift in policymaking? 
Even if policymakers are convinced that network economics would allow them to ask important 
questions and have the data and the tools to answer them, network analysis might not enter into the 
heart of policymaking in the near future. Network economics gives policymakers the ability and 
confidence to look for and to understand granular causes of many larger-scale economic phenomena. 
But network economics also requires policymakers to become familiar with new tools to evaluate 
evidence, new types of data, and recognize new pitfalls in evaluating causes and effects. Making 
changes to “best practice” in policymaking sets a high bar for any new approach. 
Nevertheless, network analysis has already entered several areas of policymaking. A considerable 
focus in macroeconomics is on how different parts of the economy interlink and affect each other. 
Intersectoral linkages, as captured by input-output tables, have been recorded and used to inform 
economic policy since the 1940s. Network tools have improved our understanding of such data, and 
its implications for shock propagation and stabilisation policy (by, for example, permitting more a 
detailed micro-to-macro approach). Similarly, while the role of social networks in diffusion of 
information and innovation was recognized in the early work of sociologists in the 1950’s, recent 
research has clarified the importance of differences in types of diffusion processes and how they 
interact with different dimensions of networks. This theoretical work has been supplemented with 
the collection of very detailed data on social networks. Together, the theory and data collection has 
helped create a more nuanced taxonomy of types of diffusion problems and the corresponding 
appropriate interventions. The success of using social network data in development contexts might 
well give confidence to governments to experiment with using social network analysis in other 
contexts, such as for labour market policies, public health measures, and fighting crime.  An important 
obstacle is using social network data for policy is privacy; citizens might also act very differently if they 
knew that the government was using their social network data to target their unemployment benefits. 
Another way in which network economics could enter policymaking is in a paradigm shift manner: as 
a response to a major crisis in which network economics is much able to explain important 
phenomena.  During the Global Financial Crisis, standard macroeconomic models failed spectacularly 
and network economics offered a coherent perspective that could both explain financial contagion 
and offer ways for governments to respond to the crisis. As a result, network analysis has now firmly 
entered into the policy toolkit in central banking and financial regulation. 
In antitrust, network economics is likely to be the most disruptive. Network economics challenges the 
accepted definition of a “market” and could fundamentally change not only how antitrust is done and 
but also how firms protect themselves from antitrust legislation. However, given the weight of 
precedents and existing laws, antitrust reform is likely to be slow. Network economists might well end 
up having to argue that network analysis is crucial for antitrust in front of a judge.  
Ultimately, as Kuhn (1962) argued, the main debate about a network economics paradigm shift (if 
there were one) will not revolve around whether network economics is better than the current 
paradigm at answering current problems, but rather whether network economics is adequately 
equipped to deal with problems that future policymakers will face. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we suggest a number of steps that different actors -- academics, policymakers, judges, 
regulators and other public institutions – can take to facilitate the use of insights from network 
economics for the design of economic policy.  
A key challenge for academics and regulators will be to further develop the network economics toolkit. 
New econometric innovations to help separate cause from effect in network based data would be 
welcome. Econometric innovations also complement theoretical ones. Empirical testing can help us 
understand which theories of network economics are most informative in which situations while 
further development of the theory can help organise the data. Policymakers will also have a role to 
play in gathering new network data. Along with regulators and other governmental institutions, 
policymakers can legislate policies that require the disclosure of new information and of some 
publicly-shared social network data, run well informed trials of potential policies to help discern their 
effectiveness, and experiment with new policies in ways that can help evaluate their impact. 
But the principal role for policymakers and judges will be in implementing reform. In the most extreme 
cases policymaking may extend to creating new legal frameworks in which economics policies 
grounded in network analysis can be implemented. As with all reforms like this, there will be short-
term losses that must be compared to potential longer-term gains. New regulations can create 
unanticipated loopholes regulated agents might exploit. New approaches also bring uncertainty: they 
undo precedents and create ambiguities. Since a network-based approach is by its nature systemic, 
resulting policy choices can be more subtle and harder for agents to anticipate. Therefore, network-
based regulation could potentially be opaque and difficult to follow. For example, banks might not 
fully understand which positions and interdependencies contribute most to their being considered 
systemically important. Under network-based antitrust regulation,  firms may be less able to 
anticipate which mergers will be blocked. While case law and the experience will eventually help 
agents adjust, the inherent complexity of a network-based regulation means that there are likely 
to be short-term adaptation costs. Therefore, patience and a long-term view will be essential for a 
transition towards effective network-based economic policies.  
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